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Civil and military relations in Indonesia actually have their own rules. If we examine history, we will find phenomena 
about the relationship between civilian and military power towards the process of social and political change in 
Indonesia. This paper aims to identify the rules of civil and military play in Indonesia in particular wanting to track 
civil and military power relations. This study tries to illustrate how the rules of the game between civilians and the 
military in Indonesia. This paper uses descriptive qualitative methods with data collection techniques by interview 
and literature study. This paper shows that civilians and the military have their respective duties in carrying out the 
mandate of the state, these two positions should not interfere with each other. After the reform of civil and military 
relations, it looks good. One of the agendas is against the Indonesian Armed Forces Dual Function (ABRI) but today, 
the issue of ABRI's Dual Function has been transformed into a Military Dual Function, ahead of the 2019 General 
Election (Election) this issue re-emerges so that it is considered political and becomes part of the project's 
representation of political interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper intends to identify the 
civilian and military rule of the game in 
Indonesia, particularly in tracking civilian 
and military power relations. Civil and 
Military are both positions that have 
political aspects. This position has its 
territorial boundaries. However, when 
juxtaposed with social and political 
phenomena in Indonesia, it seems as if this 
position does not have territorial 
boundaries. That is why, identifying civil 
and military rule of the game in Indonesia, 
especially in today's political year, must be 
able to formulate concepts and thinking 
horizons about civilian and military power 
relations. An interesting reason for the fact 
that civilians and military positions do not 
have territorial boundaries can be seen 
from the fact that positions in the legal 
aspect are less binding than in the past. Part 
of the reason is the increasingly open access 
to technology. 
The world is not yet completely border-
free, because state forms still have reasons 
to maintain control over the movement of 
people and goods in the interests of public 
safety and security (Ohmae, 2005). Civil and 
military positions still appear to have no 
control to control each other individually or 
institutionally. One of the aspects that gave 
rise to this discourse was communication. 
Communication that has always depended 
on the territorial boundaries of office, post-
reform communication between civilians 
and the military is quite good this can be 
seen from the movement of civilians who 
strongly rejected military dominance. Thus, 
communication from top to bottom proved 
able to control the problems that existed at 
that time.  
Communication issues, phenomenon 
can also be seen from the relationship 
between the TNI and the National Police, the 
political dynamics that have lasted almost 
ten years have resulted in many changes. 
Security reform does not escape the reform 
agenda, which continues to be a subject of 
interesting discussion. One of the debates on 
security reform is related to the perception, 
nature, and scope, management, and actors 
of national security (Sambuaga, 2007) in 
(Sudirman, & Fadly, 2018).  
Sambuaga wants to illustrate how acute 
the communication between the TNI and 
Polri, who have their respective duties and 
functions, must be perceived that there will 
be a tug of war that leads to a clash of state 
security actors. This is not much different 
when juxtaposed with the phenomenon of 
civilian and military relations. Civil and 
military relations in developing countries 
have one characteristic of their own and are 
much different from ideal patterns of civil 
and military relations as developed by 
western countries are not necessarily 
suitable to be applied in developing 
countries such as Indonesia. 
Even the military professionalism 
developed by western scientists as a 
condition of civil and military relations is 
seen as something too abstract and vague, 
and not suitable for developing countries' 
militaries (Finner, 1962). Samuel P 
Huntintong sees that civil and military 
relations are cross-border, starting from the 
military phase as a “conqueror” phase 
(warrior) in line with a professional military. 
This was marked by the change from "army 
of material finances" to "soldiers of holy 
calling” (Huntington, 1962). Judging from 
the changing times that have occurred in 
Indonesia, the process of changing military 
domination is correct in all aspects. Military 
groups tend to continue to dominate 
political power in third-world countries. 
However, this trend has experienced 
political ups and downs. Military 
involvement tends to be dynamic, following 
the developing political constellation in the 
country concerned. At one time the military-
dominated by strengthening its political 
grip, sometimes at other times the military 
was weakened and withdrew from the 
political sphere and surrendered complete 
power to the civilian government (Muradi, 
2005). 
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(Sundhaussen, 1986) at least put 
forward three reasons why the military 
withdrew from the political sphere. First, the 
emergence of resistance from civilian elite 
groups supported by the masses. Second, 
there is influence from outside 
(international), where the coalition 
countries withdraw and encourage 
resistance to the military regime. Third, the 
emergence of awareness and internal 
military circles, for example, recognition of 
the concept of civilian supremacy, and/or 
persistence in staying in power. The pattern 
of relations between civilians and the 
military still has an ideological tug-of-war 
with political movements, giving rise to 
dualism in civilian positions. Describing the 
nature of civilian and military relations in 
third world countries into five models, 
namely personal control (authoritarian-
personal rule). Second, authoritarian-mass 
control. Third, democratic-competitive. 
Fourth, the civil-military coalition. Fifth, the 
military oligarchy (Janowitz, 1988). 
The ups and downs of military 
involvement in politics can be identified 
from the changing times from the old order 
to the new order. In the era of the old order 
the military still impressed under the 
pressure of civilians so as to allow the 
military to seem to withdraw from the 
political momentum more focused on 
carrying out the mandate of the state in 
order to maintain the security of the country. 
However, this does not deny that the military 
is silent military professionalism is 
increasingly visible. The military clash with 
the government at that time became a 
momentum for the military to carry out its 
political movements, before the collapse of 
the old order the military's political stance 
began to look so clear, domination of power 
thickened when Suharto took the throne.  
What was raised by (Sundhaussen, 
1986) the reason why the military withdrew 
from the political arena was due to foreign 
(international) influence at least occurred 
during the momentum of Suharto's 
resignation from the throne of leadership for 
32 years. Behind this phenomenon, there is 
an implicit message that Suharto, with his 
military strength, was unable to withstand 




This research method uses a 
descriptive qualitative approach. 
Descriptive research can be defined as a 
problem-solving procedure that is 
investigated by depicting or depicting 
subjects or objects to social phenomena 
based on their symptoms (Nawawi, 2019). 
The focus of this research is to identify 
the power relations between civilians and 
the military which to this day is still a big 
question mark. The perspective used in this 
study elaborates on historical reviews and 
phenomena that occurred in 2019.. This 
research uses descriptive qualitative data 
collection techniques using interviews and 
literature study. This study uses data 
analysis techniques Miles and Huberman's 
model. Activities in the qualitative data 
analysis include data reduction, data 
display, and drawing conclusions (Miles & 
Huberman, 2007). 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 Military In Political Circle 
Discourse on the rules of civil and 
military play in Indonesia, at least the author 
presents some ideas of experts, individual 
characteristics of civilian and military 
leaders have been widely used to explain the 
rules of the game of civilian and military. 
(Moskos, 1979) in (Widiasa, 2018) 
suggested that America's post-cold war 
problems related to civil and military 
relations were a result of the Clinton 
administration's dissatisfaction with 
military norms and values. Other 
explanations focus on changes in military 
organizations. Dengan menggunakan model 
organisasi militer daUsing the model of the 
military organization from (Janowitz, 1988), 
for example, we would predict that civilian 
control of the United States military would 
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begin to deteriorate after the 
implementation of the JCS (Joint Chief of 
Staff) reforms through the Goldwater-
Nicholas Act in the mid-1980s. (Kohn, 1985) 
onnect these post-cold war difficulties with 
the strengthening of American military unity 
since Goldwater-Nicholas (Purwo Nugroho, 
n.d.). On the other hand, (Huntington, 1962). 
Argues that the higher the professionalism of 
the military, the better its civil-military 
relations. 
If the above ideas are translated 
through the situation and conditions in 
Indonesia, the military control over civilians 
is the prevailing political situation. There is 
a tendency that the ruling military regime is 
also filled with civilians (Janowitz, 1988). 
This view above predicts that institutional 
changes in the military such as the ups and 
downs of unity (unity), changes in culture, 
or changes in the level of professionalism 
will strengthen or weaken civilian control. 
However, according to the view (Desch, 
2002) this organizational perspective is also 
inadequate, because the power of civilian 
control over the military cannot be 
understood simply by examining military. 
The aspects that exist in a country such 
as leaders, organizations, military, state 
structures, and society certainly affect the 
ability to maintain the consensus of the 
country. A theory of civilian control over the 
military that considers individual, military, 
state, and social variables as they respond to 
international threats (Desch, 2002) This 
approach is used in analyzing the role of the 
military in certain countries; Alfred Stepan 
noted by (Cullough, 1992) stated that the 
main task of political sociology regarding the 
military is to discuss military institutions 
and political systems and determine how the 
institutional characteristics, especially of 
certain military institutions, shape the 
response to the influence of the political 
system (Gunawan, 2018). From some of the 
arguments above it can be said that the 
power of civilian control over the military in 
many fundamental countries including 
Indonesia is formed by structural factors, 
especially threats that affect the figure of 
leaders, military organizations, countries, 
and societies.  
Such a structural theory holds that the 
roots of patterns of civilian control cannot 
be completely reduced to the internal 
attributes of a particular state; because 
civilian control patterns are formed by the 
interaction of these internal attributes with 
the external environment. (Petraeus, 1987) 
argued, viewing this theory as differently 
configured units (a unit is a certain state 
society and a military with certain 
attributes) in the same structural position 
will usually behave the same. Like other 
structural theories, it can predict individual 
coups or other manifestations of the 
breakdown of civilian control over 
militaries; it can only mention the general 
conditions under which ordinary civilian 
control deteriorates or increases 
(Dewantara, 2016). 
This theory was tried to be tested by 
(Lievesley, 1999) who divided the two 
transition models. First, is the pact model, in 
which there are various agreements and 
alliances between old and new political 
factors to avoid chaos and conflicts that are 
considered to open up gaps for the return of 
authoritarian regimes. Classical work of 
several transition researchers such as 
O'Donnel, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986), 
and Karl and Schmitter (1991), many 
describe this transition model, where there 
is a relationship of interdependence 
between civilians, military and political 
parties, or between state institutions and 
business actors and labor unions. Second, 
the radical model which believes that the 
transition period should be directed 
towards realizing structural transformation 
fundamentally in all fields. This model was 
chosen because of the belief that the 
demands and expectations of the people will 
never be controlled only through a limited 
political process (Ewan dan Morley: 1992) 
(Tippe, 2017). 
In Indonesia, in 1958 the concept of 
"Middle Way" was proposed by General 
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Ahmad Nasution to the great revolutionary 
leader President Soekarno during the 
anniversary of the National Military 
Academy (AMN) in Magelang, Central Java 
on November 13, 1958. This concept 
provides an opportunity for a limited role 
for the military in civilian government. 
Entering the gates of the new order under 
the leadership of President Soeharto the 
concept was termed the Dual Function of 
the Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia (ABRI). 
Instead, President Suharto formulated 
the concept to be used as a military 
justification in increasing his influence in the 
government. The military can institutionally 
occupy strategic positions within the 
government. Strategic positions such as; 
Ministers, Governors, Regents, and Mayors 
and enter parliament through the ABRI/TNI 
FactionI. 
We can see that the pattern of political 
strategy played by the then ruler who was in 
power for 32 years has managed to change 
the governance system so quickly. Freedom 
of speech, freedom of expression was 
entered for 32 years in a regime under the 
pretext of development. 
The dual-functioning power of ABRI was 
gradually abolished following the collapse of 
the Suharto regime, in the era of President 
KH. Abdurrahman Wahid aka Wahid during 
a meeting of ABRI leaders in 2000, agreed to 
remove the doctrine and will begin after the 
2004 General Election. In the era of Wahid, 
he realized that restoring TNI toxic as an 
institution that has its duty and function is to 
maintain the resilience and security of the 
country is certainly not an easy thing. 
Although the concept of ABRI's dual 
function has been abolished, the military 
may carry out its practice and 
implementation. The first thing Gus Dur did 
was evaluate the structural state institutions 
by separating the TNI Commander and the 
Minister of Defense. What is interesting is 
that Gus Dur accommodated Polri by placing 
a position parallel to the TNI Commander, so 
that Polri was no longer subordinated to the 
TNI, because Gus Dur's main focus was to 
reposition the TNI without causing turmoil. 
In the 2004 elections, Indonesia was led 
by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) who 
was also a former TNI General. At that time, 
he committed to resigning his post in the 
military and founding the Democratic Party 
and stressed that the army was very 
dangerous to enter into practical politics. 
Thus, during his tenure, issues regarding 
ABRI's dual function were barely audible. 
This issue surfaced again during a TNI 
leadership meeting attended by President 
Joko Widodo when TNI Commander Marshal 
Hadi Tjahjanto expressed a discourse that he 
wanted to add new posts for high-ranking 
officers both internally and in the ministry. 
Suddenly this statement created a 
disagreement in the public sphere because it 
was considered to be able to reactivate the 
dual function of ABRI, which had long been 
lost after the collapse of the New Order and 
was also considered to injure reformation 
ideals. Therefore, the issue must be digested, 
analyzed, and then acted upon. Because this 
issue again raised in line with the 
anniversary of the five-year democratic 
party which the author later called a political 
year.  
At that time we saw the devastating 
influence of military groups in the internal 
government that ruled for 32 years, the 
country was such a terrifying scourge. 
Therefore, the authors see that it is not a 
matter of reactivation of ABRI's dual 
function or not but, there is an impression 
that a dysfunction phenomenon is occurring 
internally. The author raises a discourse on 
the dysfunction of ABRI when he examines 
the statement from the TNI Marshal Hadi 
Tjahjanto who wants to fill the TNI post. 
There is an impression that the TNI is 
not functioning normally or has disturbed its 
function internally. So, through today's 
political momentum, the discourse on ABRI's 
Dysfunction is as if eliminated, as if it were a 
living corpse. In general, the TNI 
Commander wants to provide opportunities 
for TNI officers to participate in regulating 
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the government system but forgets that the 
TNI's duty and function is to maintain the 
resilience and security of the State.  
These tasks and functions must be 
tested through improving the quality and 
capacity of the TNI officers' Human 
Resources (HR) through formal and non-
formal education such as war strategies and 
establishing a Community Research and 
Development Institute (LITBANG) and 
others. It cannot be denied that the TNI has 
so much influence on the state, but that does 
not mean that the public is prohibited from 
evaluating every work performance of the 
TNI. 
The rule of the game referred to by the 
author is to identify patterns of civil and 
military relations, civilian and military 
involvement in politics, and civilian control 
of the military. Thus, it would seem like a 
way of playing civilian and military in the 
political area. The discourse that is currently 
being discussed is the issue of the return of 
ABRI's dual function, which had long been 
lost after the collapse of the New Order. 
However, it does not rule out the possibility 
that we are currently facing even though we 
do not bring ABRI's dual function, but the 
enthusiasm will remain. 
According to political observers, Syahrir 
Karim said that if the Dwifungsi ABRI is 
correct by focusing on Law No. 34 of 2004 
concerning the TNI it is considered to harm 
the ideals of reform by limiting the role of the 
military in civilian positions. He also said 
that civil and military relations are good and 
that must be maintained and should not 
undermine the spirit of reform. Political year 
agenda which is full of political and 
tendentious elements and full of interests. 
Thus, the military is required to remain 
focused internally by providing new 
positions or structural posts for officers or 
PATI who are non-job and do not have to 
occupy civilian positions. Here it can be seen 
that the civil and military rule of the game in 
the political year can at least be stated as 
follows; First, based on the structural theory 
approach, the two positions each wanted to 
dominate, but the military tended to be more 
violent (hard action)..  
It can be seen that the level of civilian 
control over the military varies according to 
personality, character, and experience, and 
the figure of military and civilian leaders 
(Desch, 2002). The statement reinforces 
today's phenomenon, coupled with entering 
the political year. The phenomenon of 
civilian control over the military is certainly 
determined based on the situation and 
conditions that occurred at that time. For 
example, from the personality of the 
leadership, if the military leadership 
impressed pro against the ruler then of 
course it would be inversely proportional if 
the military leadership counter to the ruler. 
The ongoing political phenomenon is 
determined by the civilian response to 
civilians and vice versa. During the reign of 
Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla, who carried a 
maritime vision, emphasized what President 
Soekarno had done to strengthen 
Indonesia's maritime base.  
Political vision requires a synergistic 
concentricity with a maritime vision. There 
are at least three reasons put forward by 
(Muradi, 2015). First, the shift of world 
powers to Asia. This is reflected in how 
countries in Asia, in particular, are slowly 
having a world influence. In this context, 
Indonesia is one of the strategic countries in 
Asia to take a more effective and important 
role. 
Second, a shift in struggle and conflict, 
from ideology to the economy of resources. 
This condition reinforces the belief that 
Indonesia as a country must take the 
initiative to undertake a position affirmation 
process, which is in the context of a maritime 
country, Hence, Indonesia is strategically 
emphasizing this by one of them is 
maintaining and exploring it by one of them 
is maintaining and exploring economic 
resources and strength to play a strategic 
and effective role in the world. 
Third, Indonesia's strategic position 
between two continents and two oceans 
confirms that from a long time ago, both the 
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Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Demak Kingdom 
eras were inseparable parts of Indonesian 
history. Because of this strategic position, it 
must be admitted that Indonesia's existence 
as a maritime country has not been fully 
explored, The perspective of the state 
leadership for the past 50 years has mostly 
referred to the concept of an archipelago and 
territorial-based state. So, it is not surprising 
that in practice Indonesia has even become a 
maritime country that has not fully explored 
and utilized it for broader interests, both in 
the economic, political, and security fields.   
In this context, military doctrine can 
influence civilian control through the 
establishment of a military organizational 
structure. As stated by Andreski in (Desch, 
2002): here is an intrinsic discrepancy 
between the internal and external use of the 
armed forces. In other words, the more often 
the armed forces are used internally, the less 
capable they are to fight, and secondly (when 
the ratio of military participation is high) the 
more intensive or recently the more often 
the military is involved in warfare, the less 
responsibility and reliability it will be as a 
means of internal repression.  
Lastly, military doctrine can influence 
civilian control where the military is the 
focal point for the convergence or 
divergence of civilian and military ideas 
about the use of forces and the external 
environment. Huntington argues that much 
of the civilian relationship of the United 
States can be explained by a clash between 
two fundamentally different mindsets: 
military realism and civil liberalism, the 
former is based on a skeptical view of human 
nature, prioritizes the interests of society 
over individual interests, values order, and 
hierarchy, assumes the centrality of the 
nation-state and military power in 
international relations supports the 
discriminatory use of forces and affirms 
strict segregation between the “world” 
“military” and “civilians”. 
In contrast, civilian liberalism usually 
opposes the use of force, supports the 
elimination of force or maximum use and 
force, and regards the military as a potential 
threat to freedom, prosperity, democracy, 
and peace (Huntington, 1962). In a 
challenging external security environment, 
civilian and military ideas will converge in 
realism. In a less dangerous environment, 
civil liberalism is more likely to emerge and 
conflict with military realism, weakening 
civilian control. In this case, one thing that 
wants to be identified from the rule of the 
game from civilian and military is the extent 
of civilian control over the military. 
In addition, the civil and military rules of 
the game will be visible from the system 
prevailing in certain countries. In Indonesia, 
which adheres to a democratic system, this 
system will describe things that are different 
from civilian control over the military and 
military control over civilians. The transition 
to democracy is so much that the key to 
maintaining democracy is strong civilian 
control over the military. Unfortunately, the 
transitional literature did not give birth to 
theories about the role of civil and military 
relations. Thus, this should be identified in-
depth. 
Is the military an independent agent, or 
is it just a reflection of social power? The 
solution to this problem lies in the search for 
a generalized theoretical platform that 
explicitly incorporates the military into the 
broader process of political change (Desch, 
2002). One of the most convincing is 
Guillermo O'Donnel's argument about the 
rise of authoritarian bureaucratic regimes. 
This model rests on four different threats to 
dependency theory; Samuel Huntington's 
criticism of modernization theory; 
organizational theory; and Alexander 
Gerschenkron and Albert Hirschman's 
theory of the political consequences of 
various stages of industrialization 
(O'Donnel, 1978) in (Ma’arif, 2017). 
O'Donnel's most recent observation is, 
in contrast to the widespread assumption, 
that modernization did not give birth to 
democracy in its emergence. On the other 
hand, at least in southern Latin America, 
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there is a kind of affinity between high levels 
of modernization and authoritarian regimes. 
O'Donnel's observation above, when 
drawn into Indonesia, shows that this 
phenomenon occurred when the 32-year 
government was led by Suharto who was 
considered an authoritarian regime. At that 
time, the formulation of these doctrines in 
themselves did not bind all officers 
automatically and without reservation to the 
policies of the new order, the doctrines 
themselves in the end provide little guidance 
for the overwhelming majority of officers in 
all armed forces who generally remain 
professional and politically inactive or less 
binding on a particular establishment, and 
who with great relief welcome the device of 
muscular principles, which allow them to 
remain free from having to make difficult 
political decisions (Sundhaussen, 1986). 
 
Civilians Consolidation and Military 
In this discussion, the authors initiate a 
statement (Wahid, 1999). He stated that it is 
estimated that the political parties will one 
time win the election. It is also estimated that 
a joint TNI Chief of Staff institution will be 
formed which will be led in turn by each 
force. When the Political Parties and the TNI 
are unable to consolidate politics, neither 
party will be able to make long-term 
economic policies, so as a result the 
Indonesian economy will be managed ad hoc 
and dictated by the capital market, financial 
market, and commodity market. 
In this phase, consolidation related to 
civil and military issues is certainly a must in 
looking at the era of Consolidation of 
Indonesia in the next few years. The 
involvement of civilian and military groups 
is critical to a serious form of concern. 
Because from the historical perspective of 
Indonesia's independence the two positions 
are actively involved. Coupled with the 
involvement of these two positions to the 
leadership issue.  
Talking about the civil and military 
discourse will touch on two topics, namely 
civil-military and militarism. The discourse 
on civil and military relations appears to be 
to locate the most appropriate relationship 
functionally between civilian and military, to 
prevent the emergence of militarism. To get 
a proper understanding of this discourse, it 
is first necessary to understand the nature of 
the notion of civil and military relations. Civil 
relations need to be understood in terms of 
the distribution of authority and political 
power, especially in a democratic political 
system. Democracy rests on the sovereignty 
of the people, which in turn, through general 
elections, the people determine their choice 
to exercise power to exercise executive 
power and to jointly make laws and exercise 
control over the executive in the legislative 
power (Widjojo, 2015). 
Civil and military relations are so 
important. This is because the military is a 
component in a country that is given 
monopoly rights to use weapons of violence 
funds to carry out defense functions based 
on government political decisions. Monopoly 
using weapons and violence should not be 
mixed with political power because they are 
against democratic principles. However, 
especially in countries with developing 
democracies, the military is still in 
competition to be used as a political tool to 
support their power (Widjojo, 2015). 
In this context, we need to understand 
the pattern of relations between civilian 
authorities and military components, the 
civilian political authority which has the 
power to administer the state will determine 
when the military is used, for what military 
purposes it is used. This factor must be 
accounted for again to the people as the 
mandate for the borrower of power. On the 
other hand, military duty is related to the 
above political authority, which is to choose 
the most appropriate 
strategy/tactic/method to carry out tasks in 
the context of achieving national political 
goals, and to provide guidance/management 
of all military forces so that whenever 
necessary, the task is always in a state of 
readiness (Muradi, 2014).  
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The concept of the TNI has been put 
forward by (Janowitz, 1988) which states 
that military organization is a reflection of 
role technology. Hasnan Habib seems to be 
in line with this concept, he states that an 
organization is the ratio d'etre to face and 
overcome emergencies (emergency 
organization) which is characterized by a 
tough, strict, hierarchical centralistic 
organization, strict discipline, and moves 
under command. This characteristic is a 
habit formation. Meanwhile, Uhlin described 
the characteristic of a military organization 
as being very hierarchical and authoritarian 
in Cholis (2002) in (Ibrahim, 2012). Ideally, 
the military conception is based on its duties 
and functions as a state power in 
maintaining resilience and security. Michael 
C. Desch calls it a military doctrine, it reveals 
the environment of dangerous external 
threats (defined by participation in war) and 
military-civilian relations in the absence of a 
coup.  
Military concepts are always faced with 
civilians, this phenomenon does tend to be 
biased if it is not properly understood the 
meaning and meaning of the concept. This 
concept imposes an issue that is present in 
the pattern of relations between civilians 
and the military, namely Dwifungsi. 
Dwifunsi study tested through power with 
subject patterns (military) and objects 
(civilian). The spectrum that originated from 
the thought that comes from the old state in 
Dwifungsi has not been abandoned at all, in 
line with the fact that the new state has not 
been organized in the post-Dwifungsi era. 
Representing the old state we still see old 
concepts such as the existence of the 
ABRI/TNI Faction in the House of 
Representatives, the efficacy of the TNI-
Rakyat, territorial concepts, and the position 
of the TNI that "maintains balance with all 
parties" which refers to the Dwifungsi.  
However, on the other hand, we see 
from the beginning that concepts that are not 
present in the doctrine of Dwifungsi have 
been introduced, such as civil-military 
relations, civil supremacy, and political 
authority. At this early stage concepts based 
on democratic rules and have relevance to 
the implementation of defense functions or 
with the TNI as the executor of the main 
functions of defense, may not have been 
given articulation about its implementation, 
but has consistently been introduced. 
Therefore, the time represents that the stage 
of introduction of ideas related to the 
implementation of defense functions, and 
the TNI becomes the main executor of 
defense functions as part of the practice of a 
democratic political system (Widjojo, 2015). 
Widjojo wants to warn that in public 
spaces today there are still many 
misinterpretations of the conception of the 
military, especially when juxtaposed with 
Dwifungsi. A lack of understanding of the 
military conception will intensify hatred 
among the military. However, what is at 
issue is the method of articulating the 
relationship between the military and the 
people. From the very beginning, concepts 
that were not contained in doctrine were 
introduced.. 
That is, in the momentum of the political 
year. Military groups must be neutral, 
military impartiality can only be seen when 
there is a threat to the country, both from 
outside (international) and inside. Civilians 
are only a means of controlling the military 
movement so that it is not achieved the name 
of militarism. Because in a democratic 
country one of its instruments is freedom. 
Therefore, military boundaries must be 
controlled let alone entered the realm of 
political momentum.  
 
CONCLUSION 
From the results of the description 
above, it can be concluded that the 
identification of the rules of the game of 
civilians and the military has an instrument 
that these two positions have their own 
toxic in safeguarding the sovereignty of the 
people. Civilians and military as 
stakeholders are sovereigns by the 
community both through the political 
process and culturally, organization. After 
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the collapse of the new order and the 
coming reform period, civil and military 
relations seemed to be doing well. But 
today, the issue of the return of dwifungsi 
ABRI is back loud and it is considered to 
hurt the ideals of reform. 
The policy regarding the placement of 
the TNI in civilian positions is considered a 
political issue because this issue has re-
emerged along with political momentum. In 
addition, the civil and military rules of the 
game will be visible from the system 
prevailing in certain countries. In Indonesia, 
which adheres to a democratic system, this 
system will describe a different thing from 
civilian control over the military and military 
control over civilians. The transition to 
democracy is so much that the key to 
maintaining democracy is strong civilian 
control over the military. Unfortunately, the 
transitional literature did not give birth to 
theories about the role of civil and military 
relations. Thus, this should be identified in-
depth. 
Civil and military relations are so 
important. This is because the military is a 
component within a country that is given 
monopoly rights to use weapons and 
violence to carry out its defense function 
based on government political decisions. 
Monopoly using weapons and violence 
should not be mixed with political power 
because they are against democratic 
principles. However, especially in countries 
with developing democracies, the military is 
still in competition to be used as a political 
tool to support their power. 
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